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Abstract: As a result of public investment, lower freight transport costs tend to translate into lower local price indices and are associated with
equilibria characterized by higher output and consumption. In this paper we investigate an additional eﬀect to these trade gains, namely the
gains from better spatial matching in the labor market. We simulate a two-region Spatial OLG model in which agents are heterogeneous in
terms of skill. Under repeated simulation experiments, we show that, for high household relocation frictions, the possibility of interregional
commuting can be seen as an alternative way to realize the potential matching eﬀects. For high levels of skill heterogeneity and a plausible
parametric input, a steady state in which labor matching is realized through commuting can be associated with up to 10% higher per capita
output, compared to the one with homogenous labor, in which only gains from trade are feasible.
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1 Introduction
Upgrades in transport infrastructure decrease the cost ofmov-
ing both goods and people. e identiﬁcation of the vari-
ous channels throughwhich investment in such infrastructure
might aﬀect growth on regional or national level is an impor-
tant part of the discussion that revolves around the real value
of such investments. is paper investigates the above eﬀect
from a new perspective. More speciﬁcally, we look at how
updates in transport infrastructure aﬀect the per capita out-
put through two channels: i) better terms of trade because of
lower freight costs, and ii) improved eﬃciency in the labormar-
ket through matching eﬀects.
Decreasing trade costs tend to increase the demand for a
region’s product; this eﬀect is manifested in the ﬁrst channel.
e mechanism in the second channel, through matching ef-
fects, is less straightforward. As the frictions associated with
commuting are reduced, the spatial extent of the labor mar-
ket enlarges. Any given individual may take into considera-
tion longer commuting distances, given the shorter commut-
ing times. e individual experiences an enlarged spatial la-
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bor market, improving her chance of ﬁnding a job that better
matches her skill. As a result, the worker might end up in a
jobwhere hermarginal productivity of labor is higher than be-
fore. If this is true for a large number of workers, the transport
project might cause a spatial reallocation of labor in a way that
the overall productivity of labor in the economy increases. In
order to capture the magnitude of this reallocation, we need
a model with heterogenous, in terms of labor productivity,
matches between workers and ﬁrms. is paper introduces
this idea into a formal framework.
Neglecting matching eﬀects might lead to erroneous con-
clusions regarding the regional economic impact of transport
infrastructure investments. Furthermore, the separation of
matching gains from trade gains could be a useful tool in com-
paring alternative policies that involve public spending. For
instance, a local government might be interested in subsidiz-
ing training programs in order to raise labor productivity in lo-
cal ﬁrms. Knowing themagnitude of thematching gains from
the investment in transport infrastructuremight help the local
authority to compare the two policies.
ere is an expanding literature on the channels through
which infrastructure might aﬀect growth. For an overview
of economic models which investigate this relationship on re-
gional level, see Oosterhaven and Knaap (2003) and Rietveld
(1989); on national level, there is the survey by Agenor and
Moreno-Dodson (2006). Rioja (1999) develops a non-spatial
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dynamic general equilibrium framework to study the eﬀects
of investment in public infrastructure on GDP and welfare,
withmeasures of government investment in infrastructure ob-
tained from actual data sets for seven Latin American coun-
tries. Despite the fact that labor mobility has been identiﬁed
as a contributor to regional growth, to the authors’ knowledge,
matching eﬀects have not received adequate attention in spa-
tial general equilibrium analysis.
However, a plethora of General Equilibrium models that
incorporate at least some of the elements of land, labormobil-
ity, transport and investment in infrastructure, which consti-
tute themain ingredients of ourmodel, have been proposed in
the literature. Zhu et al. (2009) develop a two region dynamic
Spatial General Equilibrium model with an endogenous eﬃ-
ciency wage settingmechanism (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) in
order to compute the eﬀects of infrastructure projects on the
regional and national unemployment rate. eir main results
indicate that regional unemployment may go up or down but
it decreases on the national level. e model suggests that the
indirect eﬀects from infrastructure improvements that trans-
mit to the regional labormarkets account for 10 to 20 percent
of the direct eﬀects.
Abdel-Rahman and Wang (1995) construct a matching,
core-periphery GE model in which skilled and unskilled la-
bor coexist; wages are determined by Nash bargaining for the
skilled and competitively for the unskilled labor force. e
model is able to replicate interregional wage disparities and
form a local system of cities with a core metropolis emerging
due to largematching externalities. Seung andKraybill (2001)
propose amodel inwhich provision of public capital is subject
to congestion eﬀects, whichdependon the level of private cap-
ital in the economy. Anas andLiu (2007) present amodel that
equilibrates ﬂoor space, land and labor markets, output, con-
struction, and commuting for the greatermetropolitan area of
Chicago. Finally, Artige (2004) provides a model with land,
human capital and increasing returns to scale.
is paper introduces F.R.O.G.¹, a Spatial Overlapping
Generations platform to investigate the stated problem by
combining several features from the above sources in a frame-
work with diﬀerent assumptions about the level of hetero-
geneity in the labor market. e model is able to isolate
thematching eﬀects of investment in public infrastructure by:
i) computing the diﬀerence between the actual output, pro-
duced with heterogenous labor, and that produced in a coun-
terfactual state, i.e., in a world with homogenous labor, and ii)
comparing this diﬀerence for various levels of public infras-
¹ F.R.O.G stands for: Framework for the development of Regional
Overlapping Generation models
tructure. Our model moves entirely inside the Computable
General Equilibrium tradition, but incorporates some inno-
vative characteristics beyond labor heterogeneity.
First, we depart from the traditional representative house-
hold setting by introducing several simulated households with
heterogenous skill endowments. is increases the level of
ﬂexibility in themodel, since the fairly restrictive assumptions
on income eﬀects are dropped; unfortunately, this ﬂexibility
is coupled with a cost in terms of computational tractability.
Second, the inﬁnitely living agents are replaced by overlapping
generations, which face diﬀerent constraints throughout the
transition path and whose members do not necessarily inter-
nalize the costs and beneﬁts of the infrastructure investment.
In this framework, we perform a division of total gains into
trade and matching eﬀects for a plausible parametric input.
2 Model
Wepropose a SpatialOverlappingGenerationsModel for two
regions, in which agents live for two periods. Lifetime utility
maximization takes place in three diﬀerent levels. In the up-
per leel, the relevant choice of the individual is the region of
labor supply and housing location in each time period. In the
middle leel, the individual allocates time optimally between
leisure and work and determines the optimal level of total ex-
penditure in each period, given the choice of residential and
working zone of the upper level. Savings are implicitly deter-
mined at this stage through the optimal levels of consumption
and labor. Finally, in the lower leel the individual allocates
the total expenditure (decided in the middle level) into the
commodities produced in the two zones and housing.
ere is one representative ﬁrm located in each zone, which
is assumed to be amyopic proﬁtmaximizer that produces out-
put from capital and eﬀective labor units under constant re-
turns to scale. e output is sold both in the local and the in-
terregional market. Exporting the output implies a transport
cost which, due to a perfectly elastic supply curve, is transmit-
ted to the consumers of the foreign market. All output mar-
kets are characterized by perfect competition. Preferences are
assumed to be identical in the two zones. e output pro-
duced in each zone is heterogenous, since ﬁrms are assumed to
be heterogenous across geographic regions. is heterogene-
ity stems from unobserved diﬀerences in production that per-
sist over time in the two zones, i.e., errors from the aggregation
of diﬀerent types of labor into one, cultural factors involved
in production, legal and other constraints correlated with the
geographic region of production. Each individual is endowed
with a region-speciﬁc idiosyncratic skill shock which measures
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how eﬃciently the individual’s skill is supplied in the repre-
sentative ﬁrm of each region. e population variance of the
idiosyncratic skill distribution highlights the level of skill het-
erogeneity in the model. is distribution gives rise to migra-
tion or commuting between the two regions.
ere is a governmentwhich taxes labor income and invests
in the only form of public capital in themodel, a link between
the two zones. Transport costs and commuting times are de-
pendent on the amount of capital invested in the link.
2.1 Consumers
In our canonical Overlapping Generations framework, indi-
vidual choice is assumed to take place in three diﬀerent lev-
els, for each of the two generations alive in the model and for
any arbitrary time period t. We refer to these levels as upper,
middle and bottom level. In the upper level (section 2.1.1),
young individuals choose their residential, employment and
retirement location simultaneously; the choice of the retire-
ment location is based on the information held at time t and
on the beliefs formed about period t+1, i.e., when the young
individual becomes old; this choice does not involve commit-
ment with respect to retirement location. In the same level,
the old individuals retire and reoptimize their plan formed at
time t-1, i.e., when they were young. Old individuals do not
work.
In the middle level optimization problem (section 2.1.2),
young individuals engage in the choice of consumption and
leisure streams, conditional on the joint choice of their res-
idence, employment and future retirement locations of the
upper level choice problem. e upper level choice gener-
ates the alternative speciﬁc budget and time constraints. In
the same level, old individuals just consume their accumulated
savings from period t-1, conditional on their retirement loca-
tion choice which imposes the respective alternative speciﬁc
budget constraint.
In the lower level optimization part (section 2.1.3), we di-
vide the composite demanded quantity of the middle level
into demand for each of the two regional goods and hous-
ing. Both regional goods are essential in each region, i.e., the
preference relation accommodates the Armington (1969) as-
sumption. We assume that individuals consume only in their
residential (retirement) zone. e regional price index of the
composite consumption has to be derived as a unit cost func-
tion from an expenditureminimization problemwhich is spe-
ciﬁc to residential (retirement) zone. is part ensures that
the choice between labor and leisure is consistent with the de-
tailed consumption plan for the two regional goods and land.
2.1.1 Discrete joint zone choice
For the young generation, which consists of the set of individ-
uals Y, the upper level choice is considered to be a selection of
a discrete alternative that consists of a residential zone i, em-
ployment zone j and future retirement zone r among a set of
all such possible alternatives. Denote an arbitrary alternative
by the vector a = (i, j, r), where i , j , and r are chosen from
the sets of residential, employment and retirement zones, that
is I , J and R respectively. e choice set A is a set that con-
tains all vectors that can be constructed from I , J and R; that
is A= I  J R= f(i , j , r ) : i 2 I , j 2 J , r 2 Rg.
Our model refers to a two region world, i.e., NI = NJ =
NR = 2, where the geographic regions coincide². e condi-
tional on a indirect utility of any individual n whowas born in
region b and is young at time t is:
U tb na =V
t
b na+ 
t
b na (1)
whereV t
b na
denotes the conditional on a representative indi-
rect utility, i.e., the part of indirect utility which consists of
factors known to the researcher. On the other hand, one part
of the indirect utility, t
b na
, is due to factors unobserved to the
researcher. It is therefore a random variable which can be as-
sumed to follow any distribution across individuals and alter-
natives. Given this, the optimal choice of the young individual
is the alternative a 2 Awhich maximizes the conditional in-
direct utility. at is:
a = a(t ,n, b ) = argmax
a2A
V tb na+ 
t
b na (2)
Similarly, the alternative for the old generation, which consists
of the set of individuals O, is deﬁned by a^ = (r ) and belongs
to the choice set A^; old individuals do not work, but retire in
the retirement zone r of their choice. e conditional on a^
indirect utility of any individual who was born in region b and
is old at time t is:
U tb na^ =V
t
b na^+ 
t
b na^ (3)
and the optimal choice:
a^ = a^(t ,n, b ) = argmax
a^2A^
V tb na^+ 
t
b na^ (4)
Our next step is to specify the functional forms of the util-
ity functionsV t
b na
andV t
b na^
. is is done in the next two sec-
tions, wherewedevelop a complete structuralmodel for utility
maximization.
² e x-th element of the sets I, J and R, point to the same geographic
region
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2.1.2 Conditional aggregate Consumption - Leisure choice
Our task in this section is to construct a utility maximization
framework that will provide us with V t
b na
and V t
b na^
. First,
consider choosing the action a= (i , j , r ) 2A. Given that the
individual will live in zone i, work in zone j while young and
retire in zone r when she becomes old, as a implies, the prob-
lem collapses into a lifetime utility maximization under an
intertemporal budget constraint and the period speciﬁc time
constraints.
e intertemporal stochastic budget constraint imposes
non positive debt or bequests in the end of the individual’s
lifetime, i.e., aer period t+1. erefore all savings, S t
b na
,
made in t have to be consumed at t+1:
P e(t+1)a C
t+1
bna
= (1+Re(t+1))S tb na+M
e(t+1)
n   F t+1a (5)
where the savings are:
S tb na = (1  z t )w ta (1+ dbna)Ltb na+M tn   P taC tb na  ta  F tba
(6)
In equation (5), P e(t+1)a denotes the expected price of future
consumptionC t+1
bna
in retirement zone r at time t+1,Re(t+1)
denotes the expected interest rate at time t + 1, S t
b na
the
savings of the young individual conditional on the choice of
a = (i , j , r ), M e(t+1)n the expected individual income from
land rents at time t+1 and F t+1a the old individual’s cost of
relocating from the residential region i to retirement region r.
In equation (6), z t stands for the labor income tax rate,w ta
for the average regional wage rate per unit of time in region
j, dbna for the individual n’s skill deviation when born in re-
gion b and supply labor in region j, (1+ dbna)L
t
b na
the young
individual’s eﬀective labor supply in units of time, M tn for the
current individual rental income, P ta for the price of current
consumption , C t
b na
, in region i,  ta for the period commut-
ing costs from the residential zone i to employment zone j and
F t
b a
for the young individual’s cost of relocating her residence
from the birth zone b to residential zone i.
e alternative a imposes a time constraint on the young
individual, by ﬁxing an alternative speciﬁc commuting time
to v ta . For any t:
Ltb na+ `
t
b na+ v
t
a = T¯ (7)
at is, the sum of the individual labor supply, Lt
b na
, indi-
vidual leisure time, `t
b na
, and alternative speciﬁc commut-
ing time, v ta , have to sum up to the period time endowment,
T¯ . Since the young individuals will neither supply labor, nor
commute at time t+1, when they will be old:
`t+1
bna
= T¯ (8)
We are now ready to declare the young individual’s utility
maximization problem, conditional on the choice of a. As-
suming time separability, adopting a Canonical Overlapping
Generations model Acemoglu (2009) and normalizing the
period’s time endowment to 1 the problem becomes:
max
(C tb na,C
t+1
bna
,Ltb na)
u = #+'0 l o g (C
t
b na)+'1 l o g (1  Ltb na  v ta )
(9)
+
¦
#+'0 l o g (C
t+1
bna
)
©
which is subject to the constraint in (5) and a non-negativity
constraint for the conditional toa labor supply decision,Lt
b na
.
e origin speciﬁc constant, #, incorporates the mean eﬀect of
all unobserved factors that correlate with a; we assume that
these constitute social variables that are associated with the
individual’s origin, i.e., birth zone. e combination of zones
for residence, employment and retirement, encapsulated in
a, gives rise to a conditional Euler equation of intertemporal
consumption which is also individual speciﬁc. Setting up the
Lagrangian and taking the ﬁrst order conditions with respect
to consumption in periods t and t+1 yields:
C t+1
bna
C tbna
= (1+Ret+1)
P ta
P et+1a
(10)
For any given set of expectations, the system of non-linear
ﬁrst order conditions of the problem in (9) can be solved for
the conditional Marshalian demands for consumption in the
two periods (C t
bna
,C t+1
bna
), the optimal labor supply, Lt
bna
,
and the Lagrangian multipliers  and  which are attached
to the budget constraint and the non negative labor supply
condition respectively. Plugging the optimal consumption
stream and labor supply in the utility function in (9) yields:
V tb na = #+'0 l o g (C
t
bna) (11)
+'1 l o g (1  Ltbna  v ta )+
¦
#+'0 l o g (C
t+1
bna
)
©
which is the deterministic part of the conditional indirect
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utility function in (1). is utility can now be written as:
U tb na = #+'0 l o g (C
t
bna)+'1 l o g (1  Ltbna  v ta ) (12)
+
¦
#+'0 l o g (C
t+1
bna
)
©
+ tb na
We now turn to the old individual, who has saved some of
her income in period t-1, S t 1, and retires in zone r at time t.
Note again that the individual does not commit on r when
young. e maximization problem is:
max
C tb na^
u = #+'0 l o g (C
t
b na^) (13)
Which is subject to the budget constraint:
C tbna^ =
(1+Rt )S t 1n +M
t
n   F ta^
P ta^
(14)
Plugging (14) into (13) and combining with (3) yields the
conditional indirect utility for the old:
U tb na^ = #+'0 l o g
(
(1+Rt )S t 1n +M
t
n   F ta^
P ta^
)
+ tb na^
(15)
In the next sectionwe construct a submodel that disaggregates
the composite demand, C , and derive the regional consumer
price index, P , from an expenditure minimization problem.
2.1.3 Conditional disaggregated consumption
In this subsection we i) set up a model for the division of the
consumption decision into housing (land) and the regional
goods produced in themodel, and ii) derive the regional price
index. We assume that the preference relation satisﬁes the con-
dition of functional separability with respect to time and be-
tween consumption and leisure, i.e., the preferred basket at
time t is independent of leisure and the preferred basket at
time t+1.
e consumption subutility C is Cobb-Douglas, homoge-
nous of degree 1 and thus homothetic:
C tb na = (x
t
0(bna))
 (x t1(bna))
(l tb na)
 (16)
where x t
0(bna) and x
t
1(bna) refer to conditional on a, current
individual demands for the regional goods produced in
zone 0 and 1 respectively, and l t
b na
the conditional on a
demand for land. We assume homogeneity of degree 1, i.e.,
 ++= 1. We can set up the costminimization problem³:
Min e tb na = p
t
0ax
t
0(bna)+ p
t
1ax
t
1(bna)+ q
t
a l
t
b na
(17)
subject to C tb na = 1
whose solution gives rise to theHicksian demand functions for
land and the two regional goods in region i:
x t0(bna)(p
t
0a, p
t
1a, q
t
a ; 1) =
p t0i
 1 p t1i
 q ti

  1  
(18)
x t1(bna)(p
t
0a, p
t
1a, q
t
a ; 1) =
p t0i
 p t1i
 1 q ti

   1 
(19)
l tbna(p
t
0a, p
t
1a, q
t
a ; 1) =
p t0i
 p t1i
 q ti
 1
    1
(20)
and the regional price index:
P ti = e
t
bna(p
t
0a, p
t
1a, q
t
a ; 1) =
p t0i
 p t1i
 q ti

   
(21)
e unit expenditure is i) independent of individual charac-
teristics, i.e., et
b na
(p ta0, p
t
a1, q
t
a ; 1) = e
t
a (p
t
a0, p
t
a1, q
t
a ; 1),
and ii) depends on the residential region only, i.e.,
eta (p
t
a0, p
t
a1, q
t
a ; 1) = e
t
i (p
t
i0, p
t
i1, q
t
i ; 1).
2.2 Firms
Each regional sector consists of a ﬁnite number of ﬁrms that
produce a homogenous good, using eﬀective labor units and
capital as their sole inputs. We assume that the assumptions of
the representative ﬁrm theorem, i.e., competitive markets and
absence of production externalities, hold; then the economy
admits a regional representative ﬁrm (Acemoglu 2009), with
production function:
X tj = (K
t
j )
(Ltj )
 (22)
³ e cost minimization problem for the old generation is analogous
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whereK stands for the capital input andL for the use of labor,
measured in eﬀective time units. We assume constant returns
to scale, or+= 1. e output cannot be stored and sold in
a future period and ﬁrms are myopic, i.e., they cannot foresee
future prices and wages. A model with dynamic optimizing
ﬁrms, ﬁxed costs and relocation frictions is le as a topic of
future research.
e standard assumption for perfect competition,
p tj = MC (X
t
j ) cannot provide a unique sector supply
in the special case of constant returns. Instead, the rep-
resentative ﬁrm accommodates any demand at a price
given by the constant marginal cost. e conditional fac-
tor demand functions from the costminimization problem are:
LtjD(w
t
j ,R
t ;X tj )
 = X tj
8<:Rtw tj


9=;

(23)
K tjD(w
t
j ,R
t ;X tj )
 = X tj
8<:w
t
j
Rt


9=;

(24)
and give rise to the cost function:
C tj (w
t
j ,R
t ;X tj )
 = X tj (R
t )(w tj )

¨
(


)

+(


)

«
(25)
e proﬁt maximization condition yields the equilibrium
market price in region j:
p tj =MC (X
t
j ) = (R
t )(w tj )

¨
(


)

+(


)

«
(26)
It is also the case that, due to the fact thatmarginal cost is con-
stant, (26) is also a zero proﬁt condition. It is easy to show,
using the fact that the Lagrange multiplier of the cost min-
imization problem formulation equals the marginal cost and
themarginal revenue at the optimum, that the conditional fac-
tor demands in (23) and (24) are also unconditional in the
proﬁt maximizing level of output.
e representative ﬁrm exports the output to zones outside
j. In order to avoid modeling an explicit transport sector, we
adopt the Samuelson’s iceberg principle (Samuelson 1954).
at is, we assume that on the way from the manufacturing
zone j to residential zone i that imports the good, only the
fraction 1Q j i
of the exported quantity survives ’melting’ and
reaches the destination i. We refer to this as the iceberg
action. Its reciprocal, Q j i , is interpreted as the necessary
production of output in region j per unit of received output
in region i. erefore, for each region i other than j, (25)
becomes:
C tj i (w
t
j ,R
t ,Q j i ;X
t
i ) = Q j iX
t
i (R
t )(w tj )

¨
(


)

+(


)

«
(27)
and the marginal cost pricing rule in (26) becomes:
p tj i =MC (X
t
j i ) = Q j i (R
t )(w tj )

¨
(


)

+(


)

«
(28)
Note that, from (26) and (28), it can be shown that the diﬀer-
ence between the market prices of the same good in a distant
market and its home market is (Q j i   1)p tj , which implies
that the entire transport cost is transferred to the consumers
of region i. is eﬀect, which is similar to tax eﬀects in equi-
librium analysis, is a direct result of the CRS assumption in
production that gives rise to a perfectly elastic supply curve.
2.3 Government and Transport System
ere is a simpliﬁed transport system in the model, summa-
rized by a link between regions 0 and 1. e link serves the
transport of traded goods and makes interregional commut-
ing and migration possible. e iceberg fraction’s reciprocal,
Q t01, and the commuting time between employment zones
0 and 1, v t01, are decreasing, continuous functions in public
capital, KG, while Q
t
01 is also increasing in the volume of
interregional trade:
Q t01 =Q
t
01(KG, X^
t
01) (29)
v t01 = v
t
01(KG) (30)
Where X^ t01 denotes the olume of interregional trade between
regions 0 and 1 (see section 2.4). We are looking for func-
tional forms to specify (29) and (30). For the trade of goods,
we generate a new variable:
k^ t01 = (K
t
G)
!(X^ t01)
 (31)
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to which we refer as public capital adjusted for trade olume.
e parameter  is able, when set at a value diﬀerent than
zero, to capture the congestion eﬀects that are generated
from the volume of trade. Intuitively, at any  > 0 transport
costs of producers are interdependent through the use of the,
congested, public link. It turns out that the function:
Q t01 =Q
t
10 = 1+Ak^
t
01 = 1+A(K
t
G)
!(X^ t01)
 (32)
concentrates desirable properties of a function that points
transport costs to diﬀerent levels of public infrastructure.
It is convex and decreasing in K tG for ! < 0 and A > 0.
Furthermore, if we disregard congestion eﬀects:
lim
K tG!1
Q t01 = 1 (33)
and:
lim
K tG!0
Q t01 =1 (34)
With  = 0, the elasticity of the iceberg’s reciprocal with re-
spect to public capital, which turns out to be of vital impor-
tance in the evaluation of the public capital level, is:
EK tGQ t01 =
!A(K tG)
!
1+A(K tG)
! (35)
e commuting time between the two zones is assumed to be
a function with analogous properties:
v t01 = v
t
01 = B(K
t
G)
& (36)
We also assume the existence of government whose sole
task is to sustain this link or upgrade it, by collecting the nec-
essary resources in each time period, i.e., buying capital K tG
from the old generation to set up the link and charging work-
ers and ﬁrms for interregional commuting, transport of goods
and household relocations. e government taxes labor in-
come at rate z t , independent of the region. If the govern-
ment runs a balanced budget, then the generation infrastruc-
ture cost, RtK tG, has to be equal to government income:
RtK tG =
X
n2Y
¦
Ltb na(1+ dbna)w
t
a z
t
©
+
X
n2Y
 a (37)
+
X
n2Y
Fb a +
X
n2O
Fi¯ a^
Where a is a short hand notation of the optimal action of
a young individual, a(t ,n, b ), and a^ is the corresponding
short hand notation of the optimal action of an old individ-
ual, a^(t ,n, b ). e ﬁrst component on the right hand side is
the governmental tax revenue, the second is the revenue from
commuting fees, and the remaining components refer to rev-
enues from household relocations.
2.4 Period equilibrium
We are now stating the conditions for the equilibrium in each
time period. For each t the following holds:
e aggregate demand for the good produced in region 0
is the sum of the local demand, X t0(0), and the demand for
imports in region 1, X t
0(1). e demand for the local good in
region 0 is:
X t0(0) =
X
n2Y
In[a
 : i = 0] x t0(bna)C
t
bna (38)
+
X
n2O
In[a^
 : r  = 0] x t0(bna^)C
t
bna^
where In is an indicator function that attains the value 1 if
the expression in the brackets is true, i.e., if the young(old)
individual chooses to reside in region 0, and x t
0(bna)C
t
bna
is the Marshalian demand⁴ for the good from region 0. e
demand for imports of the same good in region 1 is:
X t0(1) =
X
n2Y
In[a
 : i = 1] x t0(bna)C
t
bna (39)
+
X
n2O
In[a^
 : r  = 1] x t0(bna^)C
t
bna^
Similarly, the aggregate demand for the good produced
in region 1 is the sum of the local demand, X t1(1), and the
demand for imports in region 0, X t1(0). e demand for the
⁴ Note that: x tna0C
t
na = x
t
na0(p
t
a0, p
t
a1, q
t
a ; 1)C
t
na =
x tna0(p
t
a0, p
t
a1, q
t
a ;C
t
na )
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local good in region 1 is:
X t1(1) =
X
n2Y
In[a
 : i = 1] x t1(bna)C
t
bna (40)
+
X
n2O
In[a^
 : r  = 1] x t1(bna^)C
t
bna^
and the demand for imports of this good in region 0 is:
X t1(0) =
X
n2Y
In[a
 : i = 0] x t1(bna)C
t
bna (41)
+
X
n2O
In[a^
 : r  = 0] x t1(bna^)C
t
bna^
Market clearance combined with the CRS assumption yields
a demand driven equilibrium output. In order to supply the
demanded quantities, the ﬁrms located in regions 0 and 1
produce:
X t0 =X
t
0(0)+Q
t
01X
t
0(1) (42)
X t1 =Q
t
10X
t
1(0)+X
t
1(1) (43)
Recall that Lt
bna
denotes the labor supply of the young indi-
vidual n, born in region b, conditional on a. e unconditional
labor supply is the one supplied to region j, suggested by a.
We denote this supply by Lt
bna . Let the indicator function
In[a
 : j  = 0] attain the value 1 if the young individual n is
choosing an alternative a under which she supplies labor in
region 0. e labor market clearing condition for region 0 is:
X
n2Y
In[a
 : j  = 0] Ltbna =X
t
0
(
Rt
w t0


)
(44)
And for region 1:
X
n2Y
In[a
 : j  = 1] Ltbna =X
t
1
(
Rt
w t1


)
(45)
e capital market clearing condition:
X
n2O
K tn =X
t
0
¨
w t0
Rt


«
+X t1
¨
w t1
Rt


«
+K tG (46)
e equilibrium volume of interregional trade between
locations 0 and 1 is:
X^ t01 =X
t
0(1)+X
t
1(0) (47)
e regional land market clearing condition for zone 0 is:
X
n2H0
l¯n =
X
n2Y
In[a
 : i = 0] l tbnaC
t
bna (48)
+
X
n2O
In[a^
 : r  = 0] l tbna^C
t
bna^
Where H0 denotes the set of agents that own land in region
0, with land endowment denoted by l¯n . e land demands
l t
bna(p
t
0a , p
t
1a , q
t
a ;C
t
bna) and l
t
bna^(p
t
0a^ , p
t
1a^ , q
t
a^ ;C
t
bna^)
areMarshalian sinceC t
bna andC
t
bna^ are the maximum sub-
utilities a young(old) individual can achieve under the choice
of a(a^).
e clearing condition for zone 1:
X
n2H1
l¯n =
X
n2Y
In[a
 : i = 1] l tbnaC
t
bna (49)
+
X
n2O
In[a^
 : r  = 1] l tbna^C
t
bna^
Since the zero proﬁt conditions coincide with proﬁt maximiza-
tion conditions, from (26) we get:
p t1 = (
w t1
w t0
) (50)
Note that we have implicitly adopted the standard price
normalization of an equilibrium model by setting the good
produced in region 0 as the nummeraire good and its price
equal to one. Finally, under the full capital depreciation rate⁵,
the capital accumulation rule becomes:
K t+1 =
X
n2Y
¦
Ltbna(1+ dbna)w
t
a(1  z t ) (51)
 P taC tbna +M tn   a   Fi¯ a
⁵ With full depreciation, no capital survives until the next time period
(generation). ere is no public capital le either.
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which means that the capital supply in period t + 1 consists
of the current young generation’s savings. e next sections
present the methodology of the simulation experiments, plot
the results and discuss them.
3 Simulation Experiments
3.1 Simulation Set-up and the F.R.O.G. Solution Algorithm
All experiments in this paper simulate the adjustment process
between two steady states with diﬀerent level of infrastruc-
ture. e shock is an unanticipated, permanent increase in
public capital; that is, an upgrade in the transport link be-
tween the two regions. We deﬁne the steady state equilibrium
as a situation in which capital, output and consumption grow
at a constant rate, in this case zero. e transition to the
steady state depends on the assumptions on the formation of
the agents’ expectations. We assume that these expectations
are myopic; that is, individuals extrapolate current prices,
wages and rents into the future. More speciﬁcally:
(P e(t+1)0 ,P
e(t+1)
1 ) = (P
t
0 ,P
t
1 ) (52)
Re(t+1) = Rt (53)
M et+1n =M
t
n (54)
Where the beliefs in (52) and (53) are collective while those
in (54) are individual speciﬁc. ese expectations do not need
to be correct, even on average, as it is the case for rational ex-
pectations; however, they turn out to be correct in the steady
state, where all real prices and per capita variables stabilize.
Michel and de la Croix (2000) show that, in an OLG model,
the steady states under myopic and perfect foresight are essen-
tially the same.
In order to simulate a transition process in any of our
experiments, two artiﬁcial populations of one hundred
individuals are generated, one for each zone. Population
growth is ruled out by ensuring that the two generations
have a stable number of members. Each household consists
of a sole individual in order to circumvent complications
that arise in pair decision making⁶. All individuals born
at time t inherit a land bequest from an agent who, at that
time becomes two generations old and, leaves the model. An
arbitrary individual’s skill deviation, dbn j which is the main
⁶ For a simulation model with simulated couples see McArthur et al.
(2010)
source of household heterogeneity, is drawn from a Johnson
SB distribution. at is, if the random variable d˜ follows the
Normal distributionN (,) then the transformation:
dbn j = %
0
b j +%
1
b j
8<: e x p(d˜n)1+ e x p(d˜n)
9=; (55)
is a Johnson-SB random variable, bounded on the (%0
b j
,%0
b j
+
%1
b j
) interval. at is, the individual’s innate ability, e x p(d˜n )
1+e x p(d˜n)
is bounded on the (0,1) interval. Note that this term is inde-
pendent of the individual’s region of origin, b, and the region
of labor supply, j. It reﬂects the inherent part of ability, which
is independent of education, experience or working place.
e bounding parameters %0
b j
and %1
b j
transform this un-
observed ability into a skill shock that the individual n, raised
in region b is endowed with when working in region j; thus,
each individual carries one skill shock term dbn j for each re-
gion of production. e rationale behind this is the stylized
fact that the same level of skill is evaluated diﬀerently in diﬀer-
ent regions (industries). Furthermore, themoments of the dis-
tribution of skill supplied to a region (industry) are diﬀerent
across groups of workers that originate from diﬀerent regions.
Capturing this regularities, dbn j may be viewed as amatching
term.
e errors in the utility functions in 2.1.1 are drawn from
the EV type I distribution with scale parameter 0 and loca-
tion parameter1. Capital bequests and land trade is assumed
away, in order to rule out altruistic preferences, something
thatwoulddistort theOLGstructure towards an inﬁnite hori-
zon model.
To invoke the FROG solution algorithm we use an initial
guess of the price vector v0 =(q
t
0 , q
t
1 ,w
t
0 ,w
t
1 , p
t
1 ,R
t , z t ), to-
getherwith theparameter vectors: ('0,'1,, ,,0,1) for
preferences in the middle and lower level, the parameters for
skill heterogeneity, (,) for private production technology,
( ,!,&) for the eﬀects of public capital on transport costs
and a discount rate  . We also guess an initial level of pub-
lic capital K0G. From these values, commuting time between
zone 0 and 1, v t01, and the iceberg fraction reciprocal,Q
t
10 can
be computed from (32) and (36).
Each iteration consists of the following steps. First, the
consumer optimization problem is solved from the bottom
level to the upper level. For an arbitrary individual, the re-
gional price index, P ta , is computed from (21). is price in-
dex and its myopic future expectation, P e(t+1)a , are then used
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to compute an alternative speciﬁc consumption-leisure stream
C t
bna
,C t+1
bna
for each young individual and the consumption
C t
bna^
for each old individual. To attain the consumption
stream, we insert P ta and P
e(t+1)
a in the intertemporal budget
constraint in (5) and solve the system of ﬁrst order conditions
in the consumer’s maximization problem.
For each individual, the computed C t
bna
and C t
bna^
are in-
serted into (18)-(20) to get the associated divided demands
for the manufactured goods and land. Finally, the utility of
each alternative can be computed from the upper level choice,
and more explicitly from (12) for the young and (15) for the
old individual. A simulated choice is generated when the pro-
cess is completed for every alternative of the choice set.
e set of simulated choices C of alternatives contains a
simulated choice a = a(b ,n, t ) for each young individual
and one choice a^ = a^(b ,n, t ) for each old individual. Using
these choices, we compute the aggregate demands for theman-
ufactured goods and land. ese demands are accommodated
by the regional representative ﬁrms in the equilibrium, there-
fore the simulated factor demands can be computed directly
from equations (24) and (23) by adjusting the exported quan-
tities for the melting costs. If congestion eﬀects in trade are
assumed to exist, the reciprocal of the iceberg fraction can be
computed using (47). It is then straightforward to get the sim-
ulated excess demand vector for land and labor in the two lo-
cations and for capital in the commonmarket. e set of sim-
ulated choicesC produces a simulated government revenue,
through commuting, relocation and labor supply choices of
the population. A simulated budget surplus is then computed
from (37).
e solution to the system of simulated excess demand
equations for land, labor capital and governmental surplus,
f(w,q, p1,R, z) is approximated using the Newton method
for multivariate equations (Judd 1998), combined with a
line search method. e necessity of the incorporated line
search method lies on the fact that the above system is highly
non-linear; without restricting theNewton correction in each
iteration, some prices may attain negative values between
iterations, something that contradicts the standard restriction
of non-negative prices for all private goods. e simulation
process of excess demands and supplies is performed as many
times as necessary, in order to obtain a numerical Jacobian
matrix J (w,q, p1,R, z) for the iteration-speciﬁc price vector:
vi = (wi ,qi , p i1 ,R
i , z i ). e hybrid Newton iteration
scheme is:
vi+1 = vi   "J (vi ) 1f(vi ) (56)
with"denoting a scalar in a prespeciﬁed interval between zero
and a real number, usually smaller than one. For each " a new
price vector is attained, and the one for which the Euclidean
norm
 f (vi+1) is minimized, ", is used for the next iter-
ation. e entire process is repeated until all equations are
suﬃciently close to zero; this is dictated by the convergence
criterion
 f (vi+1)  . Finally the process is repeated for
each time period, until the convergence tomyopic steady state
equilibrium has been obtained.
Since population growth has been assumed away, in themy-
opic steady state capital intensity becomes constant. Simulta-
neously, all prices, wages, rents, the interest rate and the labor
tax are stabilized to their steady state values. Note that this is
possible only when consumers are not heterogenous. In sim-
ulation experiments with skill heterogeneity, amyopic pseudo-
steady state is assumed and obtained when the factor use path
is stable enough, to ensure that the suﬃciently small ﬂuctua-
tions are produced by skill heterogeneity and not by a remain-
ing adjustment process. In this case, there is a tradeoﬀbetween
implied suﬃciency and computational tractability. Figure 1
summarizes the FROG solution algorithm.
3.2 Experiments
e simulation experiments are grouped into two main cat-
egories. e ﬁrst group contains ’textbook’ style models in
which all parameters that control skill heterogeneity are set
to 0. ese models are expected to produce zero migration
and interregional commuting, simply because their monetary
and time costs eliminate any incentive for the above actions.
erefore, agents continue to live and work in the zone they
were born, independent on how strong their preference for
their birth place, captured by # in (9), is. Despite this, they
keep on consuming the manufactured good that is imported,
by the assumption of necessity we implicitly made in the util-
ity speciﬁcation in section 2.1.3. erefore the upgrade of the
transport system has two eﬀects upon them. It reduces the
cost of trade and therefore imports become cheaper; the re-
gional price index falls and consumption is expected to in-
crease. If the infrastructure set-up was cost free, no further
investigation would be necessary. e set-up cost, however,
is collected by imposing a tax on labor income. e distor-
tionary eﬀects of this tax have an impact on the equilibrium
use of labor. It is shown that, in the case of high set-up costs
relative to transport cost gains (that is beyond a critical level
of the parameters A and!) the infrastructure upgrade might
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Figure 1:e FROG solution algorithm
lead to a steady state equilibriumwith lower output per capita
and lower use of labor.
e second set of models contains set-ups with labor skill
heterogeneity. In all settings, we assume that heterogeneity
is i) absent in the home industry and ii) symmetric with
respect to the foreign sectors. According to (55), the above
assumptions translate to:
i)%0(00) = %
1
(00) = %
0
(11) = %
1
(11) = 0 (57)
ii)%0(01) = %
0
(10) and %
1
(01) = %
1
(10) (58)
We set %0(01) =  x and %1(01) = 2x in order to postulate
a foreign sector skill deviation distribution on the interval
[ x, x]. We then perform similar simulation experiments as
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in the ﬁrst group of models, but with a major diﬀerence. We
also allow the origin speciﬁc constant to take values diﬀerent
than zero. We expect that this constant proves to be an impor-
tant control factor in the decisions of commuting and reloca-
tion for two reasons. First, it captures all the eﬀects of unob-
served factors that correlate with the area of origin: an already
formed social setting and the ability of daily-based communi-
cation with a social circle are important factors that certainly
aﬀect the decisionof interregionalmigration, but have a rather
weak eﬀect when it comes to interregional commuting. ese
eﬀects add anon-pecuniary cost on the existing pecuniary fric-
tions. Secondly, this constant increases the generalized cost of
migration compared to that of commuting. In a two period
OLG setting, it is highly unlikely that a ﬁxed relocation cost
will be dominant compared to an annual cost of interregional
commuting. Without some non-pecuniary frictions added to
relocation it is almost impossible to generate a positive com-
muting rate in the state as a result of skill heterogeneity.
3.2.1 Experiments with homogenous labor
Figure 2 highlights the ﬁrst group of experiments that are also
tabulated in table 1. e transitionpath to the ﬁrst steady state
is of minor importance and therefore omitted in all graphs.
e transition to the new steady state is characterized by an
initial boom in consumption; this is due to the fact that re-
gional price indexes fall in both regions. However the expecta-
tions over the labor tax are myopic; consumers do not foresee
the necessary tax increase in order to ﬁnance the public capi-
tal. erefore, aer the ﬁrst period in the adjustment process,
consumption is corrected for the new information revealed to
agents.
e interpretation of the results is rather straightforward.
Without labor heterogeneity, for any given set of model pa-
rameters, there exists a threshold in the cost elasticity, such
that the reduction in interregional trade costs exceeds the out-
put foregone in order to set up and perpetuate the transport
link in each generation. is is highlighted in ﬁgure 3. Of
course, the elasticity threshold level is determined fromthepa-
rameter values of table 4. We approximate this threshold level
by simulating four diﬀerent adjustment processes; in each of
them all parameters but the elasticity of transport costs with
respect to public capital remain ﬁxed. We allow the elastic-
ity to take four diﬀerent values, namely 2.25, 0.67, 0.21,
and 0.1031. In each simulation scenario we assume that the
shock that pushes the system away from its initial steady state
is a capital investment on the link. More speciﬁcally, the initial
capital on the link is set to 0.3 and is increased to 0.5. e elas-
ticities are deriveddirectly from transport technologies in (32)
under four diﬀerent assumptions about the decreased trans-
port costs. Note that the initial iceberg constant is set to 2,
i.e., only half of the exported output reaches its destination.
e adjustment processes yield four diﬀerent steady state out-
puts. We interpolate by ﬁtting a trend to these points (Figure
3) to obtain some useful conclusions. e increment in pub-
lic capital leads to increased steady state consumption only for
an elasticity of transport costs with respect to public capital
which is high enough, in this case above 0.45. Figures 4 and
5 plot the evolution of aggregate consumption and savings in
the adjustment paths.
A set of other intuitive results isworthmentioning, too. Be-
cause of symmetric technologies, preferences, and population
sizes in the two regions, all wage, rent, and price disparities
are equal to zero both throughout the entire adjustment pro-
cess and in the ﬁnal steady state. Furthermore the intergenera-
tional interest rate is slightly diﬀerent between the two steady
states since government increases its demand to perpetuate a
link that costsmore to each generation aer the shock. is re-
sult is fortiﬁed by the fact that the regional prices of consump-
tion fall when transport costs sink. Equilibrium commuting
and migration is completely determined by the initial set of
hypotheses, and is essentially zero.
3.2.2 Experiments with heterogenous labor skill
We now proceed to the second set of experiments. We adopt
as base model the one which produced the highest growth in
section 3.2.1 and compare it to three models with diﬀerent
degree of labor skill heterogeneity, and with the home-eﬀect
parameter# increased from 0 to 0.5. e parameters we have
used to generate the skill distribution in each zone are given in
the ﬁrst four columns of Table 3. Figure 6 shows a simulated
version of the Johnson-SB skill probability density functions
used in Model 1, 2 and 3, with 100000 draws. Figure 7 shows
the corresponding cumulative density functions.
It is important to recognize that, since the allocation of skill
at any point in time is nomore determined by a degenerate dis-
tribution, the output and the use of productive factors both in
the adjustment process and in the ﬁnal pseudo-steady state are
random variables that follow an unknown distribution. For
this reason, the simulation process has to be repeated to gen-
erate a sample of adjustment processes, taking into account the
trade-oﬀ between sample size and computational time. We re-
peat the simulation experiment 15  20 times as Table 3 sug-
gests. An ’average’ adjustment process for the each of the three
models is given in Figure 8.
Under the assumption that output values for the same gen-
eration across diﬀerent simulation experiments constitute an
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Figure 2:Myopic steady states and adjustment processes for diﬀerent cost elasticities
Table 1: Simulation experiments without labor skill heterogeneity
A ! Elasticity Initial Output: Y0 Final Output: Y1
0.004 -4.508 -2.250 57.734 63.810
0.195 -1.357 -0.670 57.734 59.042
0.591 -0.437 -0.210 57.734 56.397
0.780 -0.206 -0.103 57.734 55.636
Table 2: Consumption and savings in the initial and ﬁnal steady state
Elasticity C0 C1 S0 S1 % change in C % change in S
-2.25 39.56 46.96 18.16 16.83 18.710 -7.307
-0.67 39.56 42.19 18.16 16.84 6.642 -7.265
-0.21 39.56 39.55 18.16 16.84 -0.025 -7.305
-0.1 39.56 38.80 18.16 16.83 -1.924 -7.357
Table 3: Simulation experiments with labor skill heterogeneity and ﬁxed transport cost elasticity
Model %0(01) %
0
(10) %
1
(01) %
1
(10) Rounds Y0 Mean Y1 Growth
Base 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 57,734 63,809 0,105
Model 1 -0.3 -0.3 0.6 0.6 20 57,698 63,529 0,101
Model 2 -0.4 -0.4 0.8 0.8 15 57,421 65,606 0,143
Model 3 -0.55 -0.55 1.1 1.1 20 57,709 67,607 0,172
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Figure 3: Post-shock steady state output against transport cost elasticity without labor heterogeneity
Figure 4: Consumption adjustment under diﬀerent transport cost elasticities
i.i.d. samplewe construct 95% conﬁdence intervals both from
the ﬁnite properties of a random sample (solid grey lines), us-
ing the t-student distribution, and from large sample theory
(dashed lines), using the normal distribution. ese conﬁ-
dence intervals for the output level in each period are plotted
togetherwith the output adjustment process of the basemodel
in Figures 9, 10, and 12, and provide a concise measure of the
stability of the output adjustment across diﬀerent simulation
rounds.
From Figure 9 it can be seen that the diﬀerence in steady
state output level between the cases of homogenous and
slightly heterogenous labor force is not statistically signiﬁcant.
is is due to the fact that the low variance in the skill distri-
bution chokes every possibility of commuting and the unob-
served place heterogeneity captured by an origin speciﬁc con-
stant chokes thepossibility ofmigration. Under these assump-
tions, the gains from the public infrastructure shock are essen-
tially the same as in the base model, i.e., due to output trade
eﬀects only.
e picture changes in Model 2, however. Here, we
have assumed a medium degree of skill heterogeneity. e
infrastructure shock generates positive rates of commuting
throughout the adjustment process and in the new steady
state. Figure 10 shows that there are statistically signiﬁcant
labor matching eﬀects in the total output which fortify the
existing trade eﬀects. With lower frictions, a given wage rate
is more probable to compensate the commuting workers for
the loss of time and commuting expenses. Subsequently,
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Figure 5: Savings adjustment under diﬀerent transport cost elasticities
Figure 6: Simulated skill pdf for Models 1, 2 and 3 with 100000 draws.
Figure 7: Simulated skill cdf for Models 1, 2 and 3 with 100000 draws.
some of the workers that can be more productive when
supplying labor in the other region will now accept to do so
by commuting. e eﬀect can be regarded as an expansion
of the production possibilities frontier; there is a higher total
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Figure 8: Adjustment processes with various levels of skill heterogeneity
Figure 9:Original Adjustment process versus the 95% conﬁdence interval bounds of the adjustment process in Model 1.
amount of skill endowment in the economy. e increased
labormarket eﬃciencywill drive the economy to a steady state
with higher output and consumption compared to those of
the basemodel. e commuting pattern generated inModel 2
is plotted in Figure 11, where it is shown that our parametric
input gives rise to a commuting rate of approximately 4%.
Finally,Model 3 investigates the scenario of an even higher
degree of skill heterogeneity in the population. e result is
clearer in this case. e additional, matching eﬀect can cause
an additional growth of almost 7%(Figure 12). e percent-
age of the population which commutes in this case, is also
higher, as Figure 13 suggests.
4 Synopsis and future challenges
We have presented a simulated version of a heterogenous
agent, spatial OLG model in two regions. e source of het-
erogeneity stems from a one-dimensional skill deviation from
the population mean. In each simulation experiment, we sim-
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Figure 10:Original Adjustment process versus the 95% conﬁdence interval bounds of the adjustment process in Model 2.
Figure 11: Commuter percentage of the population with its 95% ﬁnite sample and asymptotic conﬁdence intervals in Model 2.
ulated two steady state equilibria: one before and one aer
a shock in the level of public infrastructure, in our case an
update in a transport link between the two zones. We have
been able to divide the output change into two main compo-
nents. e ﬁrst originates from trade eﬀects; since transport
costs are decreased, regional price indices fall and demands for
the two commodities increase. If the cost fall is suﬃcient to
outweigh the output foregone in public investment, the econ-
omy is driven to a new steady state with higher per capita con-
sumption.
e second eﬀect, which is highlighted in this paper, stems
from the eﬃciency in the labormarket; the higher the degree of
heterogeneity in skill, with which the labor force is endowed
towards the interregional production processes, the higher the
number of workers that could potentially supply this skill in
the non-domestic sector. For any given set of frictions (relo-
cation costs, commuting costs and time, unobserved factors
that correlate with the place of origin etc.), there exists one
level of skill heterogeneity that generates interregional migra-
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Figure 12: Base Adjustment process versus the 95% conﬁdence interval bounds of the adjustment process in Model 3.
Figure 13: Commuter percentage of the population with its 95% ﬁnite sample and asymptotic conﬁdence intervals in Model 3.
tion and/or commuting. e lower the frictions, the lower this
threshold is and the higher the gains frommatching.
e authors plan to further develop the platform of this
paper in the future, and estimate the model’s parameters, us-
ing the region of Öresund as empirical reference. In this
area, a signiﬁcant socioeconomic experiment takes place since
July 2000, with the opening of a bridge which connects the
Swedish cityMalmöwith theDanish capital, Copenhagen, al-
lowing the labor, land and output markets of these areas to in-
teract in an interesting way.
Having estimates of the models’ parameters will give some
insight on the portion of growth in regional product observed
aer the introduction of the bridge which has been realized
through changes in the labor market. As pointed out in the
introduction, this portion could have been realized with some
alternative policy, for instance, through employee training
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programs. erefore, a future version of themodel can be used
as an auxiliary device for policymaking of such type.
Parallel to that, the strong set of model’s assumptions leaves
space for future improvements. However, assumptions of
such strength are rather the norm than the exception when
the scope is to get some insight in a complex economicmodel.
is holds especially for the assumptions of two regions, no
population growth, and the absence of capital bequests and
land trades.
Improving transport infrastructure in this highly symmet-
rical model typically leads to symmetrical results for the two
regions. eoutputwill either increase, or decrease in both re-
gions. It is expected that the introduction ofmore regions into
the model would break such symmetries; there may be some
regions that beneﬁt while others lose. Intuitively, trade pat-
terns are dependent on the level of infrastructure provision,
and trade may be shied towards the region(s) which become
more accessible. us, the trade eﬀects stemming from an in-
crease in local infrastructure in a multiregional setting may be
negative for the relatively less accessible regions, as their ex-
port base is reduced. e authors consider the introduction
of more regions as one of the future research priorities within
this framework.
A model with households of multiple individuals would
add detail to the model as well. But in such case, the speciﬁc
decisions about how households form and make joint deci-
sions about labor supply and household location would have
to be modeled explicitly. Not only would this add a computa-
tional burden to an already intensive simulation exercise, but it
would also shi the focus of this study towards household de-
cision making, without necessarily changing the aggregate re-
sults on regional and national levels. On the other hand, new
parameters would be introduced to simulate intra-household
decisions.
Some of the assumptions are almost inevitable. For in-
stance, the assumption over the bounded univariate distri-
bution of individual skill deviation is necessary; while other
bounded transformations could be used, the use of an un-
bounded, e.g., normal, distribution would essentially lead to
some extreme draws, associated with negative eﬀective labor
supply and income.
Within the framework presented, we have utilized the as-
sumption of myopic expectations. Another common ap-
proach is that of perfect foresight, where people are thought
to have perfect information regarding future prices, wages and
rental rates. One may note that, in the presented model, a
steady state equilibrium under perfect foresight, would also
constitute a steady state equilibrium under myopic expecta-
tions, since myopic expectations are consistent with rational
expectations in steady state. It is rather the transition path that
would primarily be aﬀected by the introduction of rational ex-
pectations, i.e., by iteratively applying the solution algorithm
of section 3.1 and updating the agents expectations according
to the equilibrium solutionprovided by the algorithm. Perfect
foresight and the multiregional setting are the main modeling
challenges for the future.
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5 Appendix A: Parameters, Variables and
Notation
Table 4: Parameter Values common to all simulation experi-
ments
Parameter Value
'0 1.00
'1 1.00
 0.35
 0.35
 0.30
 0.6
 0.4
 0.95
0 0.0
1 0.0
 0.0
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Table 5:Notation: Variables
V Origin-Destination matrix of commuting times
	 Origin-Destination matrix of commuting costs
F Origin-Destination matrix of household relocation costs
C Consumption
L Labor
` leisure
T¯ Time period endowment (normalized to 1)
Pi (Pa) Price index in residential region i
M Non-labor income (from land rents)
S Savings
w Competitive wage rate per period
z Tax rate on labor income
d Idiosyncratic skill deviation
R World interest rate
Z Per period income attached to an arbitrary wage oﬀer
u Utility function in the middle level
Ua Maximum utility achieved for a given alternative, a.
x e manufactured good produced in region 0 or 1.
l housing (land)
p Disaggregate price of commodity x.
q land rent per unit.
e Minimum expenditure
K Capital.
Q j i uantity sent from region j for each unit of output received in i(Iceberg reciprocal).
KG Public capital.
X^ Volume of trade.
k^ Public capital adjusted for trade volume.
Table 6:Notation: Parameters
 Capital share in production.
 Labor share in production.
 Discount factor.
 Error term in the RUMmodel of the upper level.
" Line search scalar in the hybrid Newton method.
 Preference parameter for commodity 0
 Preference parameter for commodity 1
 Preference parameter for housing
# e eﬀect of all unobserved factors in the utility when living in the birthplace
 Lagrangian multiplier for the intertemporal budget constraint.
 Lagrangian multiplier for the non-negativity labor supply constraint.
 Congestion parameter in the transport cost function.
%0b j ,%
1
b j Bounding parameters for the distribution of skill in zone j for those born in region b.
& Public capital parameter in the commuting time function.
, Parameters of the Normal distribution.
'0 Parameter for Consumption
'1 Parameter for Leisure
0,1 Parameters of the i.i.d. EVI distribution for the error terms.
! Public capital parameter in the transport cost function.
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Table 7:Notation: Subscripts-Superscripts-Sets
a Arbitrary alternative for the young individual
a^ Arbitrary alternative for the old individual
p Vector of local price indices
I e set of residential zones
J e set of employment zones
R e set of retirement zones
Y e set of young individuals
O e set of old individuals
i An arbitrary residential zone
j An arbitrary employment zone
r An arbitrary retirement zone
n An arbitrary individual
b Birth zone.
Ns e t Number of elements in an arbitrary set.C e set of simulated choices in each iteration round.
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6 Appendix B: Summary of key equations
Table 8: Young consumers
Conditional (on a) utility function:
u = #+'0 l o g (C
t
b na
)+'1 l o g (1  Ltb na  v ta )+
¦
#+'0 l o g (C
t+1
bna
)
©
Conditional (on a) Euler equation.
C t+1
bna
C tbna
= (1+Ret+1) P
t
a
P et+1a
Conditional (on a) consumption/leisure:
`t
bna
C tbna
= 1
0
P ta
w ta (1 z t )(1+dbna)
Conditional (on a) stochastic intertemporal budget constraint:
P e(t+1)a C
t+1
bna
= (1+Re(t+1))S t
b na
+M e(t+1)n   F t+1a
Conditional (on a) savings equation:
S t
b na
= (1  z t )w ta (1+ dbna)Ltb na+M tn   P taC tb na  ta  F tba
Conditional (on a) subutility function:
C t
b na
= (x t
0(bna))
 (x t
1(bna))
(l t
b na
)
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Table 9:Old consumers
Conditional (on a^) utility function:
u = #+'0 l o g (C
t
b na^
)
Conditional (on a^) consumption:
C t
bna^
=
(1+Rt )S t 1n +M tn F ta^
P ta^
Table 10: Firms
Production function:
X tj = (K
t
j )
(Ltj )

Eﬀective labor demand:
LtjD(w
t
j ,R
t ;X tj )
 = X tj

Rt
w tj



Capital demand:
K tjD(w
t
j ,R
t ;X tj )
 = X tj

w tj
Rt



Cost function:
C tj (w
t
j ,R
t ;X tj )
 = X tj (R
t )(w tj )

n
(

)

+( 

)
o
Table 11: Government, Transport system and other key equations
Balance equation:
RtK tG =
P
n2Y
¦
Lt
b na (1+ dbna )w
t
a z
t
©
+
P
n2Y  a
Elasticity of the iceberg reciprocal with respect to public capital:
EK tGQ t01 =
!A(K tG)
!
1+A(K tG)
!
Capital accumulation:
K t+1 =
P
n2Y
¦
Lt
bna (1+ dbna )w
t
a (1  z t )  P taC tbna +M tn   a   Fi¯ a
©
Regional price index:
P ti =
p t0i
 p t1i
 q ti

   
e Eﬀects of transport inastructure on regional economic development 
References
Abdel-Rahman, H. M. and P. Wang. 1995. Toward a
general-equilibrium theory of a core-periphery sys-
tem of cities. Regional Science and Urban Economics,
25(4):529–546. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/
regeco/v25y1995i4p529-546.html.
Acemoglu, D. 2009. Introduction to modern economic growth.
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Agenor, P.-R. and B. Moreno-Dodson. 2006. Public infras-
tructure and growth: newchannels andpolicy implications.
Policy Research Working Paper Series 4064, e World
Bank. URL http://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/4064.
html.
Anas, A. and Y. Liu. 2007. A regional economy, land use,
and transportation model. Journal of Regional Science,
47(3):415–455. ISSN 1467-9787. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9787.2007.00515.x. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.
1467-9787.2007.00515.x.
Armington, P. S. 1969. A theory of demand for products
distinguished by place of production. Staﬀ Papers - In-
ternational Monetary Fund, 16(1):pp. 159–178. ISSN
00208027. URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3866403.
Artige, L. 2004. Endogenous growth and regional dynamics in
an olgmodel with land. Discussion Papers 2004028, IRES -
Institut deRecherches Economiques et Sociales. URLhttp:
//ideas.repec.org/p/ctl/louvir/2004028.html.
Judd, K. L. 1998. Numerical methods in economics.
0262100711. Cambridge,MA:eMITPress. URL http:
//ideas.repec.org/b/mtp/titles/0262100711.html.
McArthur, D., I. orsen, and J. Uboe. 2010. Amicrosimula-
tion approach to modelling spatial unemployment disparities.
Ph.D. thesis, Norwegian School of Economics andBusiness
Administration.
Michel, P. and D. de la Croix. 2000. Myopic and perfect fore-
sight in the olg model. Economics Letters, 67(1):53 – 60.
ISSN 0165-1765. doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(99)00246-
3. URL http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
pii/S0165176599002463.
Oosterhaven, J. and T. Knaap. 2003. Transport projects, pro-
grammes and policies: Evaluation needs and capabilities,
chapter Spatial economic impacts of transport infrastruc-
ture investments, pp. 87–105. London: Ashgate.
Rietveld, P. 1989. Infrastructure and regional development:
A survey of multiregional economic models. e Annals of
Regional Science, 23(4):255–74. URL http://ideas.repec.
org/a/spr/anresc/v23y1989i4p255-74.html.
Rioja, F. K. 1999. Productiveness and welfare implica-
tions of public infrastructure: a dynamic two-sector gen-
eral equilibrium analysis. Journal of Development Eco-
nomics, 58(2):387–404. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/
eee/deveco/v58y1999i2p387-404.html.
Samuelson, P. A. 1954. e transfer problem and transport
costs, ii: Analysis of eﬀects of trade impediments. e
Economic Journal, 64(254):pp. 264–289. ISSN 00130133.
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/2226834.
Seung, C. K. and D. S. Kraybill. 2001. e ef-
fects of infrastructure investment: A two-sector
dynamic computable general equilibrium analy-
sis for ohio. International Regional Science Review,
24(2):261–281. doi: 10.1177/016001701761013150.
http://irx.sagepub.com/content/24/2/261.full.pdf+html,
URL http://irx.sagepub.com/content/24/2/261.abstract.
Shapiro, C. and J. E. Stiglitz. 1984. Equilibrium unemploy-
ment as a worker discipline device. American Economic Re-
view, 74(3):433–44. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/
aecrev/v74y1984i3p433-44.html.
Zhu,X., J. VanOmmeren, andP.Rietveld. 2009. Indirect ben-
eﬁts of infrastructure improvement in the case of an imper-
fect labor market. Transportation Research Part B: Method-
ological, 43(1):57–72. URL http://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/
transb/v43y2009i1p57-72.html.
